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Introduction
Book-tax conformity is an old issue in Germany. For more than one hundred years the determination of corporate taxable income has been characterized by the so-called Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip (authoritative principle, Sec. 5 (1) 1 EStG), which governs the traditionally close relationship between financial and tax accounting in Germany. 1 In this regard, literature often points to Germany and the U.S. as countries not only adhering opposite positions (Schön, 2004, p. 430.) , but also as important examples for two ongoing trends in the linkage between financial and tax accounting (Shaviro, 2009, p. 155) . While there have been calls for a one-book system in the U.S. (e.g. Desai, 2005) , there are several reasons why Germany and other European countries are moving towards a two-book approach, under which the two income measures are largely independent.
2 Clearly, German tax law still requires corporations to determine corporate taxes based on its individual financial statement prepared under German GAAP. However, tax accounting is not -and never has been -necessarily the same as financial accounting. Anecdotal evidence (e.g. Herzig/Briesemeister, 2010, pp. 63-64) even suggests that the reporting gap has increased during the last two decades. For example, Schön (2005, p. 116) reports on an increase in differences between book and taxable income due to the change of paradigm in German GAAP, e.g. following the introduction of the IFRS. Although the academic attention has -not least through the recent debate on the German Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG) -focused on these differences between book and taxable income in Germany, the empirical literature is rather small. While empirical investigations have found significant interactions between book-tax differences and, for example, tax avoidance (e.g. Blaylock/Shevlin/Wilson, 2012) or tax sheltering (e.g. Wilson, 2009 ) in the U.S., little is known about the actual magnitude and sources of the reporting gap in Germany.
Based on a unique sample of more than 140 matched tax return and financial statements, 3 this study attempts to close this gap in research and, for the first time, provide empirically valid estimates of book-tax differences in Germany. While present literature is based on empirical data from Anglo-Saxon countries, this is -to our knowledge -the first study to use observed, 1 For an overview of the historical developments see Pfaff/Schröer, 1996 , pp. 963-967, Schön, 2005 Freidank/Velte, 2010, pp. 185-188. 2 See Schanz/Schanz, 2010, p. 313. 3 Confidential tax return data are obtained from Ernst & Young GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany and are not publicly available. Because tax return data are confidential and protected under Sec. 9 BOStB, all statistics are presented in aggregate. Any opinions are those of the authors and so do not necessarily reflect the views of Ernst & Young GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany. rather than supposed, book-tax differences in a one-book system setting. 4 This being said, the data not only enables us to measure the reporting gap in Germany most accurately, but also to provide a comparative counterpoint to prior empirical U.S. In doing so, it evaluates the extent to which financial and tax accounting differ, identifies major sources of book-tax income differences and finally sheds light on the question of whether tax aggressive reporting adds to the reporting gap. Furthermore, the ability to analyze actual reported taxable income, as opposed to estimated income measures from publicly available financial statements or simulated tax income makes the results a valuable source of information in other research settings.
5
In other words, with access to actual tax return data, we are able to provide investors, analysts and researchers who lack that access to private tax information with insights on the degree and sources of book-tax differences in Germany and thus contribute to literature in at least two ways.
First, this study contributes to the stream of literature inferring firms' tax attributes or taxable income from publicly available financial statements in Germany (e.g. Kager/Schanz/Niemann, 2011 and Finke/Heckemeyer/Reister/Spengel, 2010, respectively) . By providing explanations for the observed differences between both income measures, the intuitive motivation behind this is to help research without access to tax return data to obtain a better estimate of taxable income using publicly available information (Frank, 2009, p. 67) . To this end, we follow Plesko (2007) and comprehensively analyze how well financial statement figures represent the corresponding tax values of a firm. We test for both book-tax balance sheet differences and book-tax income differences. In fact, tests indicate that both income measures are different and taxable income exceeds annual net income before taxes reported to shareholders, on average, by approximately 10%. Given this, we continue and examine the relation between these book-tax income differences and publicly available financial statement variables using a model that controls for various other tax and non-tax factors known to be associated with book-tax differences. We find that book-tax-differences are mainly associated with differences in accounting for provisions and important off-balance sheet adjustments, such as exempt dividend income or interest add-backs. As these findings hold when several robustness tests are performed, we are confident that the results provided are valid beyond the relative small number of firms included in the unique sample. 4 Please note that Eberhartinger/Klostermann (2007) study the effects of a potential decisiveness of IFRS for the national tax base based on a small sample of 61 Austrian companies. 5 See for a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using tax return data, Manzon/Plesko, 2002, pp. 184-187; Graham/Mills, 2008, pp. 371-373. Second, as the reporting gap may be due to factors other than legal differences, we investigate whether book-tax differences also reflect aggressive tax reporting. In line with Frank/Lynch/Rego (2009, p. 468) , we define the latter as "a downward manipulation of taxable income through tax planning that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion".
In an attempt to measure tax aggressive reporting we argue that if proxies for tax planning are associated with book-tax differences after controlling for the most important legal differences between financial and tax accounting, then we can assume that the reporting gap is not only driven by such legal differences but also by other economic factors, e.g. tax aggressive reporting. Consistent with the legal framework in Germany, our findings suggest that the reporting gap in Germany is generally not attributable to tax aggressive reporting. However, we find a strong positive association between the reporting gap and those companies being involved in corporate restructurings; an area where conformity between financial and tax accounting is, in general terms, not required. While the interpretation of this finding requires caution, the results indicate that firms are willing to give up the administrative advantages of one-book accounting in order to achieve desired tax or financial accounting result, if book-tax conformity is not required. Thus, we may not only provide insights into the relatively unexplored area of behavioral response to switches in the degree of book-tax conformity, 6 but also add a new perspective to the German discussion surrounding the implementation of the BilMoG-Act in 2010 and, more general speaking, to the ongoing policy debate book-tax conformity in many other European countries and, of course, the U.S.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature and the relationship between financial and tax reporting in Germany, while Section 3 describes the data used in the analyses. Section 4 presents an analysis of the matched tax return and financial statements data and tests the actual relation between tax and financial accounting measures of income. Next, the methodological approach is developed in Section 5 and the results are reported in Section 6. Conclusions are provided in Section 7.
Background

Financial and tax accounting in Germany: The framework for 2009
German corporations have to determine corporate income for two external purposes. The first is for financial accounting purposes and the second to determine corporate taxable income.
Financial accounting involves maintaining individual financial statements, which are prepared 6 Hanlon/Heitzman, 2010, p. 136. under German GAAP to determine distributable profits and inform external parties. In addition, consolidated group accounts are required by joint stock corporations and other companies with limited liability.
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Unlike individual financial statements, group accounts are, however, neither conformed to nor directly affected by taxation (Sellhorn/Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006, p. 188; Goncharov/Werner, 2009, p. 10) . Rather, their main objective is to provide information regarding firm performance relevant to shareholders and other interested external parties. In contrast, the objective of tax accounting is first and foremost to raise tax revenue and achieve economic goals, i.e. encourage or discourage certain behavior deemed (un-)desirable by policymakers. In other words, it reflects the economic objectives of revenue collection, equity, efficiency and simplicity (Shackelford/Slemrod/Sallee, 2011, p. 463) .
Although the objectives of financial and tax accounts differ, there is a strong alignment between individual financial statements and the determination of taxable income in Germany.
As mentioned above, this holds, however, only true for individual financial accounts. While tax accounts are, to a certain degree, conformed to individual financial statements, group accounts are not. Thus, only individual accounts serve as the starting point for the determination of corporate taxable income. Due to the so-called Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip (authoritative principle, Sec. 5 (1) 1 EStG) taxable income has to be determined in accordance with German GAAP and the recognition and measurement policies applied in financial accounting must generally be incorporated into tax accounting. The linkage is even strengthened as the inverse of the authoritative principle applied until the fiscal year 2009 9 , i.e. accounting choices exercised for tax accounting must similarly be exercised in individual financial statements.
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Despite this close alignment between tax and financial accounting, income for tax and accounting purposes is not necessarily the same. Instead, there are several reasons why financial and tax accounting are different.
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Most importantly, because the objectives of financial and tax accounting differ, specific tax regulations supersede financial accounting rules in several ways. For example, provisions are measured differently under tax law, e.g. it is required to discount provisions at a rate of 5.5% for tax purposes, which generally results in lower tax values (Sec. 6 (1) No. 3a EStG). Some other provisions are simply not allowed. Mainly due to 7 For details see Ordelheide, 2001 Ordelheide, , pp. 1355 Ordelheide, -1440 For an overview of the basic concept of determining corporate taxable income in Germany see, among others, Endres et al. (2007 ), European Commission (ed.), 2005 Eberhartinger, 1999, pp. 97-103. 9 Please note that the inverse authoritative principle was abolishment with the BilMoG-Act in 2010. For details see, among others, Herzig/Briesemeister/Schäperclaus, 2011, pp. 2-4. 10 For a detailed discussion on the reserve authoritative principle and its consequences for financial and tax accounting see Pfaff/Schröer, 1996, pp. 970-971. 11 See for a review Hanlon/Heitzman, 2010, p.130; Shackelford/Slemrod/Sallee, 2011, pp. 462-464. budget restrictions, provisions for contingent liabilities, for instance, must be recognized for financial accounting purposes, but are prohibited for tax accounting since 1997 (Sec. 5 (4a) EStG). Similarly, any decline in the value of current assets is recognized immediately for financial accounting purposes, but disregarded for tax purposes unless the reduction in value is expected to be permanent (Sec. 6 (1) No. 2 EStG). While these examples refer to balance sheet adjustments that relate to timing differences in accrual accounting, it is important to note that corporate income determined on the tax balance sheet is, in a second step, modified by certain off balance sheet adjustments. In contrast to balance sheet adjustments, such off-balance sheet adjustments are not related to accounting accruals and generally present permanent book-tax differences, i.e. items are included or excluded in one measure of income but never in the other. Important off balance sheet adjustments resulting from different objectives include (partially) tax-exempt dividend income (Sec. 8b KStG), non-deductible interest expenses for trade tax purposes (Sec. 8 No. 1GewStG ) and the tax loss relief (Sec. 10d EStG).
Beyond the differing objectives, another, at least a suspected, source of book-tax differences is opportunistic reporting under either or both systems. Although tax and financial accounting are closely tied, firms may engage in tax planning or tax aggressive reporting that lowers taxable income relative to book income. At the same time, financial accounting earnings may be managed upward, yielding financial statement income to increase relative to taxable income, if the firm does not pay tax on the managed earnings. In this regard, also the regulations of the German Tax Reorganization Act (UmwStG) become important. Despite the general authoritative principle linking financial and tax accounts, book-tax conformity is not required in privileged reorganizations.
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In other words, while reorganizations may be accounted for at bookvalue for tax accounting purposes, a step-up to the fair market value might be possible in financial statements and vice versa. Thus, accounting for reorganization involves more managerial discretion and is an area potentially available for tax planning or earnings management.
Prior literature
As outlined above, there are different reasons why financial and tax accounting -although closely aligned -are different in Germany. Many studies have concluded that these differences have increased throughout the last decades (e.g. Herzig/Briesemeister, 2010, pp. 63-64) and called for a substitution of the one-book approach by a more independent set of tax ac-counting regulations (e.g. Weber-Grellet, 2008 , p. 2453 Manzon/Plesko (2002) , for instance, find that a small number of factors that reflect differences in accounting are responsible for a significant amount of book-tax differences. In doing so, they measure the reporting gap as the difference between domestic income and es- 13 For a review of the discussion about the potential benefits and costs of book-tax conformity, see Atwood/Drake/Myers, 2010, pp. 113-114; McClelland/Mills, 2007, pp. 782-785. 14 The divergence between tax and book income has been measured and analyzed in many different studies including Plesko (2000) or Desai (2003 On the other hand, research also suggests that large book-tax differences signal tax planning and tax aggressive reporting (e.g. Mills (1998) , Desai (2003) and Heltzer divergence between book and taxable income and increasing sheltering activities, he finds that one major source of the reporting gap can be explained by the fact that managers are able to undertake upward management of book income without being subject to immediate tax payments.
Data and sample selection
In line with Plesko ( including all necessary tax reconciliations and attachments. While present literature is based on empirical data from Anglo-Saxon countries, this is -to our knowledge -the first study to use observed, rather than supposed, book-tax differences in a one-book system setting.
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This being said, the data not only enables us to measure the reporting gap in Germany most accurately, but also to provide a comparative counterpoint to prior empirical U.S. research. Moreover, as data is provided for at the entity-level, i.e. the starting point for the calculation of corporate taxable income, we are able to directly address book-tax conformity and the functioning of the authoritative principle in Germany. In addition, as different consolidation rules between individual financial statements and tax returns do not generally exist, one of the main disadvantages of using tax return information identified by Graham/Mills (2008, p. 372) 
or
Hanlon/Heitzman (2012, p. 139) is avoided. Note: Company size is defined according to total assets (financial accounting). In accordance with German GAAP, small corporations display total assets of not more than EUR 4,840,000. Corporations are classified as medium-sized if total assets range between EUR 4,840,000 and EUR 19,250,000. Total assets of large corporations exceed EUR 19,250,000.
Overall, the initial sample consists of 146 unique incorporated firms, i.e. there is only one observation for each corporate group. As partnerships and other limited liability companies are taxed as flow-through entities, only incorporated companies are included in the sample.
Moreover, banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions were excluded from the dataset since different reporting requirements may apply. We exclude these observations with missing data on some tax attributes or important control variables. This elimination leaves a final sample of 132 firms. All firms included in this sample were chosen randomly by EY. In order to avoid biases due to location or specific tax planning schemes, consideration was, however, given to the industry, the company size and the location of firms in the sample. In detail, EY was asked to provide anonymous data for four different industry sectors, three different company sizes and different places of business of the considered firms. The latter guar-antees that tax returns are prepared by different offices and tax advisors of EY Germany. Table 1 provides a description of the industry and territorial distribution as well as the firm size of companies included in the final sample. Furthermore, EY collected detailed data about the group structure, past reorganizations, or reporting requirements for each firm in the sample.
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The reporting gap: Magnitude and sources
In order to analyze the relation between tax and financial accounting and given the unique nature of the data, we begin by examining several book-tax balance sheet differences. As pointed out by Kager/Schanz/Niemann (2011, p. 91 ) tax values of corporate assets and liabilities can be relevant for various economic decisions and may serve as additional information on current and future firm performance. Moreover, book-tax balance sheet differences are of great value when identifying sources of book-tax income differences. As balance sheet differences report the cumulative effects of several reporting periods, they provide more information about past accounting decisions than differences in income measures, which primarily provide information on income differences for the current period.
In the first step of the analysis we, therefore, test how well the financial statement position reflects the tax book value of a firm. We follow Plesko (2007) and run simple t-tests for the hypotheses that the absolute differences between tax book values and financial statement values are statistically different from zero.
19
Subsequently, we also test for differences between the amount of book income reported to shareholders and the amount reported to tax authorities on the corporate tax returns. As described above, the tax return data contains two different measures of income: First, taxable income as determined by the tax balance sheet and second, corporate income subject to tax, i.e. the income shown on the tax balance sheet modified by certain off-balance sheet adjustments. In order to identify sources of book-tax differences and shed light on the question whether and to what extent the amount of income calculated for financial and tax accounting purposes is different, both measures are compared to the corresponding financial accounting measures of income.
18 Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 5 . 19 As some of the variables have skewed distributions, we re-estimate all of the t-test reported using a nonparametric signed-rank test. The results are identical to those reported here. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the distribution of relative book-tax balance sheet differences, i.e. the absolute difference divided by the financial statement value for the main balance sheet items and total assets. Given the comprehensive linkage of financial and tax accounting in Germany prior to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act, we expect that balance sheet values reported on firms' financial statements and the corresponding tax returns would be the same or, if they differed at all, the financial statement value of assets would exceed the tax return book assets. This would be more consistent with the incentives inherent in book-tax differences (Mills/Newberry/Trautmann, 2002 , p. 1122 . Instead, we find that fixed assets and current assets for tax purposes are, on average, greater than assets reported on financial statements. In detail, the mean of tax return fixed assets exceeds book fixed assets by 2.28% and tax return current assets exceed book current assets by 0.62%. Consequently, also book total assets are lower than those reported on the tax return (2.51%), but not statistically different. it is worth noting that fixed assets are not different from each other. The same holds also true for all sub-categories of fixed assets, i.e. tangible assets, intangible assets and financial assets. In contrast to findings in other legal settings where depreciation of fixed assets is recognized as one of the major instruments to manage taxable and book income in different directions, nearly 63% of the considered firms report exactly the same amount of fixed assets for both financial and tax accounting purposes. Moreover, there are 22 firms (16.67%) for which differences between book fixed assets and tax return fixed assets are smaller than 5%.
Book-tax balance sheet differences
As discussed earlier, the recognition and measurement of provisions is considered to be one of the major balance sheet adjustments foreseen by tax law. Accordingly, we find that accounting for provisions is among the most significant factors in the divergence between balance sheet items reported under financial and tax accounting. On aggregate, provisions reported on financial statements exceed tax provisions by 11.05% and approximately 75% of the firms in the sample report different amounts for financial and tax accounting purposes. Moreover, in the last quarter of observations, differences in accounting for provisions are greater than 13.85%. As a result, the test of whether the difference between financial accounting provisions and provisions reported on tax returns is equal to zero is rejected (t-value: 2.601).
Last, in line with the findings of Zwirner (2007) find that only two out of the 132 firms in the final sample show book-tax differences in accounts payable exceeding 5%. Table 3 compares the amount of book income reported to shareholders and the amount reported to tax authorities on the corporate tax returns. As described in Section 2, we examine two book-tax income differences. The first is the difference between the annual net income (ANI)
Book-tax income differences
reported to shareholders and the corporate taxable income reported on the tax balance sheet.
Second, we compare the difference between annual net income before taxes (ANIBT) with actual taxable income before tax loss offset. We use the pretax measure of book income to be consistent with taxable income, which is a pretax measure.
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To this end, both income measures are determined before any income pooling for all entities of a tax group. This eliminates the effects of income pooling and allows focusing solely on accounting differences. Several things stand out in 
Explaining the reporting gap: Multivariate analyses
Up to this point, we have examined how well financial statement values represent the tax characteristics of a firm. In particular, we find that income reported to shareholders is statistically different from taxable income. While these results suggest that taxable income cannot directly be inferred from annual income reported on financial statements without measurement error, the findings provide no clear evidence about the origins of book-tax differences in Germany. In this section, we therefore examine the relation between book-tax differences and publicly available financial statement variables using a model that controls for various tax and non-tax factors known to be associated with book-tax differences. The main objective of these tests is to identify the most important sources of differences between both measures of income and to contribute to an enhanced understanding of book-tax differences in Germany in order "to help constituents obtain a better estimate of taxable income using publicly available information" (Frank, 2009, p. 67) . Put another way, we aim to provide those interested in inferring taxable income from financial statements with information about the main sources of book-tax differences, which may be beneficial in avoiding much of the potential measurement error. Moreover, considering variables known to be related to tax planning activities also allows us to investigate whether book-tax differences are caused mainly by known differences between financial and tax accounting or stem from tax aggressive reporting.
Research design
The relationship between book-tax differences and some (publicly) available variables is examined by running the following cross-sectional regression by firm f, where the dependent variable of interest is the book-tax differences (BTD) and the remaining variables are discussed in Table 4 :
The regression model tests the relationship between book-tax differences (BTD) and certain financial ratios, various tax variables and some firm characteristics that have been suggested by prior literature to be associated with tax planning activities. To this end, BTD is modeled as the absolute difference between annual net income before taxes and corporate taxable income as reported on the tax return.
Due to the skewed distribution of BTD, we use, however, the log normal of BTD in order to address the possibility that violations of the normality assumption could drive the results of the applied ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In order to increase the interpretability of the results, we also use the log normal for all included balance sheet ratios.
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While this commonly applied data transformation results in a model with more constant error variance, it leads, for technical reasons, to a further reduction of the sample size to 130 observations. In terms of the explanatory variables, we first include four different financial ratios in an attempt to operationalize the numerous balance sheet adjustments discussed above. More specifically, we expect a strong positive relationship between BTD and provisions, defined as the amount of total provisions scaled by total assets, as various non-discretionary balance sheet adjustments exist in the area of accounting for provisions under German tax law. In addition, we predict a positive relationship between the share of current assets in total assets (CATA) and BTD, since the univariate analysis has shown that current assets for financial and tax accounting purposes are statistically different from each other. By contrast, fixed assets reported on firms' financial statements and tax returns are not statistically different. Nevertheless, we include capital intensity as well, because depreciation of fixed assets is generally recognized as one of the major instruments when managing taxable and book income in different directions. Still, we do not have unambiguous expectations regarding the sign of the relationship. Second, several tax specific variables are included to control for the main off-balance sheet adjustments as described above. Specifically, we expect a strong positive relationship between BTD and loss-carryforward, where loss-carryforward equals "1" if the firm either reports an existing loss-carryforward for corporate income tax and/or for trade tax purposes and "0" otherwise. Next, the number of subsidiaries (# subsidiaries) captures the effects of the partial tax exemption (95%) of dividends received. In short, as received dividends are generally excluded from taxable income while included in book income, we predict a positive association between BTD and those firms with numerous subsidiaries. Despite the fact that the comparison of accounts payable for financial reporting and tax shows that the values are not statistically different, we also include leverage, defined as the ratio of the firm's total accounts payable to total assets, to capture the effects of interest add-backs for trade tax purposes and the nondeductibility of interest expenses under the earning stripping regulation. Hence, a positive relationship is also expected between leverage and BTD.
Third, we also include attributes that are assumed to be associated with tax planning in order to identify whether BTD is driven by aggressive tax reporting, which is consistent with the idea that book-tax differences in individual financial statements are associated with tax planning, rather than with incentives to manage financial earnings. We argue that if, after controlling for the most important legal differences between financial and tax accounting, proxies for tax planning are associated with higher BTD, then we can assume that BTD is not only driven by legal differences between financial and tax accounting but also by other economic factors, e.g. tax aggressive reporting. To this end, we assume that firms which are more likely to be engaged in any kind of tax planning are also more likely to take advantage of opportunities to manage taxable income. In other words, if firms are actually engaged in tax aggressive reporting, then the coefficients on the estimates of tax planning activity are expected to be significant. Otherwise, we have to conclude that book-tax differences in Germany are rather not caused by opportunistic reporting.
However, this approach requires identifying explanatory variables that measure tax planning but that do not necessarily affect the amount of book-tax differences mechanically. As suggested by prior literature (e.g. Wilson, 2009, pp. 985-986; Frank/Lynch/Rego, 2009, p. In other words, while firm restructurings may be accounted for at book-value for financial accounting purposes, a step-up to the fair market value might be required or is possible for tax purposes, e.g. in order to set off the step-up profits against current or previous losses. At the same time, the German Tax Reorgan- (Prinz, 2007, p. 130) . Consistent with the broad literature on reorganizations and tax planning, 26 we therefore expect a positive relation between BTD and reorganization. However, two things must be noted: First, any effects of reorganizations on BTD must not be interpreted as an indicator for continuous income management, but rather as a one-time accounting choice. Second, an unambiguous distinction between tax planning and non-discretionary book-tax differences is difficult, i.e. firms may be legally forced to report different values for tax and financial reporting. Hence, reorganization may only be a noisy proxy for general tax planning and the interpretation of results requires caution.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We begin the analysis by reporting descriptive statistics for the final sample in Table 5 . The mean book-tax difference is EUR 1,541,577 with a minimum BTD of EUR 102 and a maximum of EUR 65,481,240. Considering the scaled measure of BTD used in one of the robustness tests as discussed below, book-tax differences are, on average, approximately 4.3% of total assets. The spread between the minimum and maximum values is considerably high, which demonstrates the large heterogeneity in firms` reporting gap.
27 Table 5 reports the main statistics for the independent variables. In terms of the asset structure, capital intensity is, on average, 23%, while current assets account for 72% of total assets.
Reporting on the capital structure, leverage and provisions have a mean of approximately 45% and 16%, respectively. Considering the other tax variables included in the model, nearly 38% of the firms in the sample report a tax loss-carryforward and approximately 36% have at least five subsidiaries.
In terms of the variables that proxy for tax planning, pretax return on asset (PTROA) has a mean of 4.33%. Although the sample period (fiscal year 2009) covers the recent economic downturn, average PTROA is positive. Overall, slightly less than one third of the sample observations report negative PTROA. Furthermore, approximately half of the firms included in the sample can be classified as a subsidiary of a foreign parent company and about 23% of the observations report a reorganization during the past five years. Finally, the share of observations which belongs to a tax group, i.e. firms that pool income for tax and financial statement purposes, is nearly 25% of the firms included in the final sample. At the same time, about 56% of the firms in the sample are required to prepare or report their result in consolidated group accounts. Table 6 presents the results from OLS regressions. To estimate the extent to which BTD can be explained by institutional factors, i.e. legal differences between financial and tax accounting, we follow Manzon/Plesko (2002, p. 208) and first present two model specifications including only those variables that are expected to be associated with legal differences between both measures of income. As mentioned above, these institutional variables reflect both balance sheet and off balance sheet adjustments which generate temporary as well as permanent differences between taxable income and income reported to shareholders.
Regression Results
In the first specification (column (1)), we find a strong relationship between BTD and provisions, but no significant relationships with the other two financial ratios. Not surprisingly, we also document a positive significant relationship between BTD and the control variable firm size. After controlling for firm characteristics, the estimated coefficient on provisions is positive, indicating that book-tax differences are significantly greater for firms with higher ratios of provisions to total assets. This result is consistent with the univariate analyses presented above and, once again, indicates that the measurement and recognition of provisions is one, if not the most, important factor in the divergence between tax and financial reporting. In this regard, important examples include provisions for contingent losses which may not be recognized for tax purposes (Sec. 5 (4a) EStG) as well as the tax-specific measurement criteria for pension provision under Sec. 6a EStG. Unlike the differences in current assets, for which we cannot find a significant effect on BTD, differences in the recognition and measurement of provisions directly translate into income differences between both accounting measures and, therefore, should be accounted for when inferring taxable income from financial statement information.
When the measures of off-balance sheet adjustments are added in Specification (2), the results reported above remain unchanged. However, the additional variables provide further insights into what drives book-tax differences in Germany. Notably, the R 2 from estimating Specification (2) increases by more than 0.12, indicating that the relatively few tax variables measuring off-balance sheet adjustments explain a substantial portion of the reporting gap. First, the presence of a loss-carryforward is strongly positively related to BTD, consistent with the expectation that the loss-relief system adds significantly to the reporting GAAP. In addition # subsidiaries is positively related to BTD, suggesting that firms with more subsidiaries and, therefore, a higher share of tax-exempt dividend income in total annual net income have a greater wedge between book and taxable income. Accordingly, we suggest taking the taxexemption of dividend income (Sec. 8b KStG) into consideration and partially deducting earnings on investments from ANIBT when estimating taxable income from financial statements. The same holds true for permanent differences arising from add-backs of interest payments on debt. Even though the recognition and measurement of accounts payables as discussed in Section 3 does not yield significant differences in the book and tax balance sheet values, leverage is significantly related to the reporting gap. The positive relationship between leverage and BTD is consistent with the expectations that the partial non-deductibility of interest payments for trade tax purposes as well as the non-deductibility of interest payments under the earnings stripping regulation (Sec. 4h EStG in conjunction with Sec. 8a KStG) adds significantly to the reporting gap. (1)- (4) is ln(BTD), i.e. the natural logarithm of the absolute differences between corporate taxable income reported on the tax returns and annual net income before taxes (financial accounting). In Specification (5) BTD is scaled by annual net income before taxes. In Specification (6) BTD is scaled by total assets and firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of annual sales. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 4 and winsorized at the 5% level in Specification (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Turning the attention to the question whether BTD may also be driven by aggressive tax reporting, we add the measure of profitability PTROA, which is frequently used in literature to proxy tax planning activity, and other firm characteristics associated with tax planning in Specification (3). To begin with, the signs and significance levels of the coefficients of the legal variables are largely unchanged when the new variables are included. At the same time,
we find no significant relationship between the book-tax gap and tax planning activity variables in the full model specification. While reorganization is only marginally significant in certain specifications, 28 none of the other considered tax planning variables is significantly related to the reporting gap. The results support the notion that there are little opportunities to manage taxable income while not reducing book income, at least as far as we can estimate opportunistic reporting. In contrast to the U.S., where book-tax differences are assumed to reflect tax planning (e.g. Armstrong/Bloouin/Larcker, 2011, p. 9) , large book-tax differences in Germany are not likely related to tax aggressive reporting. Accordingly, literature that uses book-tax differences as explanatory variables is advised to not put too much reliance on prior findings under different legal settings, but rather to consider that book-tax differences are the result of legal differences between financial and tax accounting, which cause accounting practice in Germany to be far away from a common measure of income.
Robustness tests and extension
In order to determine the robustness of the core model and ameliorate the effect of influential observations, we run three simple robustness tests. While all continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level in Specification (4), we re-examine our measurement choice of BTD in Specification (5) and (6). In the primary analyses we measured BTD using the absolute amount of book-tax differences. Even though controlling for firm size, the use of an absolute number may potentially lead to some undesirable consequences. For this reason we scale BTD by annual net income before taxes and in line with prior research (e.g. Mills, 1998) by total assets, respectively. In order to minimize bias to the estimated effect of firm size that results from errors in measuring the true scale variable, we use the log normal of sales (Umsatzerlöse) as firm size measure when BTD is scaled by total assets in Specification (6).
The results of the robustness tests are largely consistent with those reported for the core model and support the findings that legal differences between financial and tax accounting are the major source of differences between financial and tax accounting in Germany. The coeffi-cients on provisions as well as the three measures for off-balance sheet adjustments are positive and consistently significant. All tax planning variables remain -or in case of reorganization turn -insignificant. Yet, firm size is significant in Specification (6). While prior research associates firm size with tax sheltering (Wilson, 2009, p. 987) or tax-avoidance (Rego, 2003, p. 820) , i.e. the costs of tax planning decrease with the size of the firm, we document a negative relationship between scaled BTD and firm size. Although consistent with taxable income exceeding financial statement income in Germany, we rather not interpret this finding as evidence for any influence of tax planning on the reporting gap, but refer to a more technical reason. In short, given that small absolute BTD can turn to high ratios of BTD to total assets for firms reporting considerable low total assets, we assume a strong influence of such small firms, thus explaining the negative association between firm size and scaled TD.
Up to this point, we implicitly assumed that the incentives to manage taxable or financial statement income are the same for all firms. Given that firms are -under the conditions of Sec. 264 (3) HGB -exempt from disclosing individual financial statements when disclosing consolidated group accounts, one may, however, expect that firms being released from the disclosure requirements have different incentives to manage income in their individual financial statements. In particular, this should hold true for those firms that report IFRS group accounts, as there is no legal link between individual financial statements prepared under German GAAP and IFRS group accounts. While we assume that there is less motivation to manage earnings reported on individual financial statements for these firms, we expect more taxinduced differences between the two income measures.
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In an (untabulated) extension to the core model we, therefore, control for group account, where group account equals "1" if the firm is required to disclose consolidated IFRS group accounts and "0" otherwise, and also include interactions of group account with the variables that proxy for tax planning activity.
In this regard, differences to the results reported in Table 6 will be interpreted as evidence that firms have different incentives to manage income and that tax aggressive reporting may add to the reporting gap for certain types of firms. However, the results of the extended model are substantially the same as those reported above. First, the coefficients, significance levels and signs of the core explanatory variables remain largely unchanged. In line with the previous robustness test, only reorganization turns insignificant. Second, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable group account is positive but not significant. Moreover, we find that the interactions are not significant and coefficient are not very different from the standalone vari-29 See for a similar argumentation Haller/Ferstl/Löffelmann, 2011, p. 889. ables, indicating that the reporting gap for firms reporting consolidated IFRS group accounts does not differ from book-tax differences reported by other firms. Given that the results of the core model failed to detect an influence of aggressive reporting on the reporting gap, this is not surprising and consistent with our interpretation that legal differences rather than incentives to manage income are the major source of book-tax differences in Germany.
To conclude, we cannot provide evidence that firms which are more likely to engage in tax planning report significantly different BTD than other firms. Consistent with the German accounting framework for 2009, we therefore conclude that tax aggressive reporting -as far as we can estimate opportunistic reporting -does not significantly add to the overall reporting gap.
Supplemental analyses
BTD is a measure which includes both balance sheet and off balance sheet adjustments -the latter are not related to accounting accruals -and may be a noisy proxy to test for opportunistic or tax aggressive reporting. To mitigate this concern, we re-examine our measurement choice of BTD in supplemental tests and run the previously discussed regressions for the dependent variable BSBTD, defined as the absolute differences between corporate income reported on firms' tax balance sheet and annual net income (ANI). In doing so, all firms reporting no differences between the two measures of income are omitted from the sample. This is done, since firms reporting zero differences are obviously not engaged in any form of income management yielding differences in taxable income and income reported to shareholders. This elimination leaves a sample of 108 observations.
As before, the first two model specifications reported in Table 7 examine the relationship between BSBTD and known differences on financial and tax accounting. Using BSBTD as the dependent variable, we document a strong relationship between the reporting gap and provisions, i.e. the coefficient of provisions remains significantly positive. That is, differences in the recognition and measurement of provisions directly translate to income differences. Consequently, research should be careful in estimating taxable income from financial statements for those firms reporting a relatively high ratio of provisions to total assets. Consistent with BSBDT measuring book-tax differences before off-balance sheet adjustments, all other variables that control for legal differences between financial and tax accounting turn insignificant. (1)- (4) is ln(BSBTD), i.e. the natural logarithm of the absolute differences between corporate taxable income reported on the tax balance sheet and annual net income (financial accounting). In Specification (5) BSBTD as is scaled by annual net income before taxes. In Specification (6) BSBTD is scaled by Total Assets and firm sized is measured as the natural logarithm of annual sales. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 4 and winsorized at the 5% level in Specification (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
These results remain largely unchanged if the variables associated with tax planning are included (Specification (3)), if outliers are eliminated (Specification 4) and if scaled BSBTD are considered in Specification (5) and (6). Again, we document a strong negative relation between BSBTD and firm size when scaling BSBTD by total assets.
Looking at the measures of tax planning, the results indicate a significant influence of reorganization on BSBTD. While the more general measures of tax planning remain insignificant, the coefficient on reorganization is significantly positive in all model specifications, indicating that firms which have been involved in corporate restructuring exhibit significantly greater book-tax differences than others. This result is consistent with our expectations, the findings of the core model as reported in Table 6 (Specification 3) and are not surprising given the considerable opportunities for non-conform reporting in corporate reorganizations. Overall, it
suggests that book-tax differences are higher when book-tax conformity is reduced. As discussed above, the findings need, however, careful interpretation for several reasons. First, it has to be kept in mind that an unambiguous distinction between aggressive reporting and nondiscretionary book-tax differences is difficult as firms may be legally forced to report different values for tax and financial reporting after corporate restructuring. Hence, reorganization may only be a noisy proxy for tax-induced differences between the two income measures.
Nevertheless, given the widely recognized opportunities to plan taxes or financial statement earnings in the course of corporate reorganizations and, of course, the source of our sample, we expect that the positive relation between BSTBD and reorganization is -at least to some degree -explained by some sort of opportunistic reporting.
Second, assuming that such accounting incentives lie at the root of the observed relation between BSBTD and reorganization, the economic motivation behind it is ambiguous. One explanation is earnings management. To this end, firms clearly have incentives to step-up the acquired assets to their fair market value for financial accounting purposes, while, if possible, opting to continue with book-values for tax purposes, e.g. in order to avoid immediate taxation of hidden reserves. However, another explanation is tax planning. Even in privileged reorganizations, i.e. assets can be accounted for at present book-value for tax purposes, there are incentives to step-up in the acquired assets. For example, firms may choose to step-up assets along with a corresponding depreciation base to reduce future tax payments or to set off the step-up profit against current or previous losses. Similar to previous literature, we cannot determine which of these factors -for some firms the factors may even operate simultaneously -generate the observed book-tax differences. Irrespective of the economic motivation we can, however, conclude that firms are willing to give up the administrative advantage of a one-book system in order to achieve desired tax or financial accounting results, if book-tax conformity is not required. In other words, we interpret the positive relation between BSBTD and reorganization as an indicator that the benefits from non-conformity outweigh the additional compliance burden of keeping two books for tax and financial accounting. Indeed, this finding is valid only in case of corporate restructuring in our setting. However, it indicates how firms may react to switches in the degree of book-tax conformity and, therefore, has important implications for the question of what would happen if Germany continues moving towards a two-book approach, under which the two income measures are largely independent.
Conclusion
This study examines book-tax differences in Germany to provide evidence on the magnitude and sources of the reporting gap and contribute to the ongoing policy debate on book-tax conformity. Despite the close link between financial and tax accounting in Germany, we document that corporate taxable income and the amount reported to shareholders diverge a great deal. Furthermore, regression results that control for firm size and different determinates of tax planning provide robust evidence that legal and known differences between financial and tax accounting lie at the root of this reporting gap. While reporting significant relationship between firms' book-tax differences and, for example, the ratio of provisions to total assets, the study cannot provide evidence that opportunistic tax reporting adds to the reporting gap.
In supplementary analysis, the study shows, however, that those firms being involved in corporate restructurings report significantly higher book-tax differences than other firms. Although the interpretation of this result requires caution, it indicates that firms are willing to
give up the administrative advantage of a one-book system in order to achieve desired tax or non-tax results, if book-tax conformity is not required. Thus, we may provide new insights into the relatively unexplored area of behavioral response to changes in the degree of booktax conformity, while also adding a new perspective on the discussion surrounding the economic implications of the BilMoG-Act in Germany, in particular, and book-tax conformity, in general.
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Beyond this finding, the study also provides useful insight for future empirical research: To our knowledge, this study is the first examination of confidential tax data in Germany. The 30 See for a discussion of the implication of the BilMoG-Act on tax aggressive reporting, Ortmann-Babel/Bolik, 2010 , pp. 2099 -2103 Ortmann-Babel/Bolik/Gageur, 2009, pp. 934-938. data examined in this paper has the invaluable advantage of being based on actual tax returns rather than on estimated taxable income. Therefore, it allows not only to measure the reporting gap in Germany most accurately, but also to distinguish types and sources of book-tax differences. However, as with most empirical studies, the data has some shortcomings and there are at least two caveats with respect to our results. First, our sample is relatively small, covers only one reporting period and includes only firms known to have demanded professional tax advice. Accordingly, the results may not generalize to the entire German business population or other reporting periods. Second, we cannot directly observe aggressive tax reporting and the measures of tax planning undoubtedly include measurement errors. Hence, the study is only a first, but important, step in adequately addressing the relationship between book-tax differences and opportunistic reporting in Germany. At the same time, there are some unique and important lessons to be learnt for future research: Researchers that aim to infer firms' tax characteristics from publicly available data will find suggestions on which legal differences between financial and tax accounting to incorporate into models that estimate taxable income. In addition, literature that uses book-tax differences as explanatory variables is advised to not put too much reliance on prior findings under different legal settings, but rather to be careful when interpreting book-tax differences in Germany. In contrast to the U.S., where book-tax differences are assumed to reflect tax planning (e.g. Armstrong/Bloouin/Larcker, 2011, p. 9), large book-tax differences in Germany are not likely to be related to tax aggressive reporting, but are rather the results of legal differences between financial and tax accounting.
